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Why are investors rushing to purchase US government securities when the US is the 
epicentre of the financial crisis? This column attributes the paradox to key emerging 
market economies’ exchange practices, which require reserves most often invested in US 
government securities. America’s exorbitant privilege comes with a cost and a 
responsibility that US policy makers should bear in mind as they handle the crisis. 
Introduction 
A familiar script has played as the global financial crisis has spread, picking up speed and 
intensity. The drama has three acts that have been written out in the historical record for 
as long as there have been open financial markets. 
• Act One: Unbounded Enthusiasm. Some markets find favour with global 
investors.1 Credit becomes readily available, asset prices percolate, and many 
categories of spending are buoyed. 
• Act Two: Day of Reckoning. Recognition that some of that enthusiasm was 
overdone spreads among investors. New credit flows cease, collateral is sought, 
asset prices crash, and prominent private-sector icons crumble. 
• Act Three: Restoration. Here governments pick up the pieces, typically passing on 
the cost to future generations by issuing a vast volume of debt. The cost can be 
punishing because investors pull away from the governments of emerging market 
economies as forcefully as they do from private creditors.2 
American exceptionalism 
But there has been one prominent exception to this classic tale. With fitting irony, the US, 
which is the epicentre of the crisis, has avoided Act Three. The US enjoyed a capital 
inflow bonanza that funded yawning current account deficits, and asset prices spiralled 
upward only to crash. While the crash has constricted credit and is redrawing the 
financial landscape, the US has not been punished by investors in typical Act-Three 
fashion. 
If this had happened to any other government in the world whose national financial 
institutions were in as deep disarray as those of the US, investors would have run for the 
hills – cutting off the offending nation from global capital markets. But for the US, just 
the opposite has happened. 
Rather than facing prohibitive costs of raising funds, US Treasury Bills have seen yields 
fall in absolute terms and markedly in relative terms to the yields on private instruments. 
This has been called a “flight to safety”.3 But why do global investors rush into a burning 
building at the first sign of smoke? 
The answer lies in part with the exchange market practices of key emerging market 
economies. 
Since the last global market panic, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998, many governments 
have stockpiled dollars in their attempts to prevent their exchange rates from 
appreciating. At the same time, the long upsurge in commodity prices has swollen the 
coffers of many resource-rich nations. As a result, and as shown in the latest forecast in 
the World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund, international reserves 
of emerging market economies are expected to have increased $3.25 trillion in the last 
three years. According to the Fund’s survey of the currency composition of those 
holdings, the bulk is in dollars (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 
 
The dollar portion of these reserves is most often invested in US government securities, 
which offers excellent market liquidity, and US government debt is also considered as 
safe as anything (following a precedent laid down by the first Secretary of the Treasury, 
Alexander Hamilton).4 All this explains the dollar’s popularity with foreign investors 
who might otherwise be expected to shun the US. As the Figure 2 indicates, foreign 
official entities now own almost one-quarter of outstanding government securities (the 
upper panel). These holdings of securities constitute about 10% of non-US nominal GDP 
(the lower panel). 
Our currency, your problem 
Herein lies the special status of US government securities. For a few of the world’s key 
decision makers, it is not in their economic interest to stop, or even slow, the purchase of 
Treasury Bills. As Keynes once said: “If you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you have 
a problem. But if you owe a million, the bank has a problem.” Potential capital losses on 
existing stocks keep foreign investors locked into US government securities. 
Figure 2 
 Figure 2 also shows a precedent for recent financial market strains. The last time foreign 
official purchases bulked so large in the US government’s financing was from 1968 to 
1973, when the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates broke down.5 At that 
time, keeping the system going required increasing support from abroad, primarily from 
Europe. This time around, the source of that support has shifted to Asian-Pacific 
economies and Middle East exporters. In both cases, the message from the US seems best 
summarised in the words of then-Treasury-Secretary John Connolly, who famously 
advised, “the dollar is our currency, but your problem.” 
As the tone of those words suggests, another lesson from the earlier experience is that 
foreign resentment with a US-dominated arrangement grows over time. That America 
could be a source of financial instability and a haven of sovereign financial security 
seems to some, to quote Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, to be an “exorbitant privilege.”  
In this episode, Treasury yields have fallen and the foreign exchange value of the dollar 
has appreciated recently. Moreover, many European financial firms have had funding 
difficulties associated with a lack of access to dollar liquidity. This has made it necessary 
for European officials, caps in hands, to seek swap arrangements with the Federal 
Reserve to acquire dollars to re-lend to their national champions. 
Recent enthusiasm in Europe for fundamental reform of the international monetary 
system finds its roots, in part, in this resentment. They do not want our dollar to be their 
problem, and they want to erode some of that privilege. Put it those terms, however, it 
seems clear that this will mostly be a one-way conversation. US officials must recognise 
that their nation’s funding advantage rests on the unrivalled, for now, position of US 
government securities in global financial markets. Thus, they will listen and agree to 
work-streams for groups to report back in the future. But whether it is this Administration 
or the next, advantages to the US, unfair as that may seem as viewed from abroad, will 
seem worth preserving. 
An exorbitant privilege that comes with a cost and a responsibility 
These advantages come with a cost and a responsibility. Open access to markets probably 
allowed US officials to drift in their response to the financial crisis. They initially 
mistook a solvency problem for a liquidity one. When action was ultimately forthcoming, 
Treasury officials failed to articulate a clear sense of principles and priorities for 
intervention. This ad hoc improvisation has probably stretched out and intensified the 
crisis. In a crisis in an emerging market economy, the sudden stop of credit to the 
government forces painful adjustment to be done quickly.6 These adjustments may have 
been painful, but a quick response tends to reduce the overall bail-out cost. 
As for responsibility, officials must recognise that investors have granted the US its 
reserve-currency status for reasons. Size matters, but other reasons include a respect for 
the rule of law and for contract enforcement and the predictability and transparency of the 
policy process. 
When US officials move to the next stage of the crisis – the search for legislative 
protections to prevent a recurrence – it will be important to preserve these attractive 
aspects of US markets. 
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Endnotes 
1 In Reinhart and Reinhart (2008a and b), we refer to this act as a “capital flow bonanza.”
2 Such funding strains have frequently been sufficient to compel governments to default. 
This is why we find in Reinhart and Reinhart (2008a) that episodes of capital flow 
bonanzas help to predict sovereign defaults. 
3 Following market practice and legal convention, government securities include those of 
the US Treasury and the government-sponsored enterprises. 
4 The history of US debt is not unblemished. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) report that the 
US never defaulted on its sovereign external debt but that the abrogation of the gold 
clause in 1934 constituted a domestic default.  
5 Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) have dubbed this latest period Bretton 
Woods II, in part exactly because of the role of foreign official purchases in facilitating 
US current account deficits. They pose plausible reasons why it might be in the self-
interest of foreign officials to do so. Another possibility, as discussed earlier, is that 
existing portfolio holdings are so large that officials are in a self-fulfilling trap.  
6 In this regard, the current US situation is more akin to that in Japan in the 1990s, when 
policymakers delayed addressing the fundamental problem of non-performing loans and 
favoured half-measures for some time. The Japanese government could tap a large pool 
of domestic saving to fund its equivocations so that the opinion of global creditors was 
not relevant. The lesson is market discipline does not apply either if a nation is too big to 
fail or saves too much to care. 
  
 
